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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, two previously moribund subjects have received a sudden burst of
scholarly attention. One is state constitutional law, a subject that until recently was
almost completely ignored. Another is the constitutional right to keep and bear arms, a
subject that has always received a great deal of attention among nonacademics (chiefly
those opposed to gun control), but until recently has received little attention in the
scholarly press. Both subjects are now the focus of much more writing, primarily because
of the publication of articles by well-known authors that suggest the topics deserve
attention. In the case of state constitutions, two important articles started the trend: one by
Justice Hans Linde, of the Oregon Supreme Court,[1] and one by Justice William J.
Brennan Jr., of the United States Supreme Court.[2] In the case of the right to bear arms,
the initial article was Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment,[3]
which concluded—perhaps surprisingly in light of its author's left-leaning stance--that the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution must be taken seriously, even by
those of us in legal academia, despite a fairly widespread desire to wish it away.[4](p.648)
This brief Essay combines these two trends by addressing another neglected
subject: the right to keep and bear arms under the Tennessee Constitution. As far as I am
able to determine, this topic has never been the subject of scholarly commentary. I hope
that my contribution to this Symposium will, in its own small way, be as successful in
stimulating discussion in this field as the works mentioned above have been in theirs. An
examination of the Tennessee Constitution in this context may also be useful in the
general debate over the meaning of the Second Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Both provisions grow out of the same eighteenth-century variety of republicanism and
appear to have been meant to serve the same purposes. Yet, the Tennessee Constitution's
provision is drafted differently, and has been more thoroughly interpreted in the courts.
As a result, its meaning is likely to be somewhat clearer to modem readers.
I. THE TENNESSEE PROVISION AND THE U.S. SECOND
AMENDMENT: SOME COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS
Though it may be unstylishly straightforward, I have always believed that the text
is a good place to start when examining a constitutional issue.[5] While not every
provision of law is clear and unambiguous, we owe it to the drafters--and to ourselves, as
lawyers—to begin with the language that is in front of us. Tennessee's Constitution
guarantees: "That the citizens of this State have a right to keep and to bear arms for their
common defense; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of
arms with a view to prevent

Electronic
Electronic
copy ofcopy
this paper
available
is available
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=960815
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=960815

crime."[6] A discussion of the right to bear arms, as is true with a discussion of any
state constitutional provision, tends to call up thoughts of the corresponding provision in the
Federal Constitution. Thus, it is also worthwhile to look at the Second Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution by way of comparison. The Second Amendment provides: "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."[7] Immediately, important differences appear.
Interpretation of the Second Amendment is not easy: as Professor Levinson notes, it is one
of the murkiest constitutional provisions.[8] Nor has there been much help from the (p.649)
Supreme Court.[9] Nonetheless, some arguments that have been raised with regard to the
Federal Second Amendment are clearly inapplicable to the Tennessee Constitution's right to
bear arms clause.
The most obvious involves the federal provision's reference to the "Militia." Many gun
control proponents have argued that the Second Amendment merely ensures some degree of
independence for state-regulated militias (usually characterized as the modern day National
Guard); thus, it does not protect individual rights to firearms ownership at all.[10] Whatever
the merits of this "collective right" argument in the context of the Federal Constitution,[11]
it is unpersuasive in the context of the Tennessee provision for two reasons.
First, the term "militia" does not appear in the Tennessee provision. Rather, the
provision is aimed at the "citizens of this State," which seems to rule out any sort of
governmental body. This is made clear elsewhere in the Tennessee Constitution. Article I,
Section 24 provides:
That the sure and certain defense of a free people, is a well regulated militia; and, as
standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to freedom, they ought to be avoided as far
as the circumstances and safety of the community will admit; and that in all cases the
military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil authority.[12]

This provision does not deal with the right to bear arms. Rather this provision is the
collective right clause of the Tennessee Constitution. Unlike the Federal Constitution, the
Tennessee Constitution separates its militia and right to bear arms provisions. However, the
present-day effect of this collective right provision is not entirely clear: Would it guarantee
the right (at least subject to being "well regulated") of individuals to form private militias of
the sort common in the early days of this state? Or (p.650)would it at least produce a duty on
the part of the state to maintain and regulate a militia by requiring ownership of arms and
competence in their use?[13] These fascinating questions are for another article and another
day. But at a minimum, the very existence of this provision makes it clear that the right to
bear arms clause of Article I, Section 26, does not include the protection of a collective
right to have a well-regulated militia to which one may or may not belong. That right is
addressed elsewhere.
Second, it seems unlikely that a provision in Tennessee's Declaration of Rights is
intended to protect an institution of state power against federal power. Such a provision
would be void under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitutions.[14] Nor--in spite
of the "common defense" language of the Tennessee Constitution--would a characterization
of the right as a state's right make sense. Under our federal system, powers not granted to
the federal government may be lodged in either the states or the people, making it possible,
at least in principle, to argue about whether a particular provision in the federal bill of rights
protects individuals or the states. Yet within a particular state, power must be lodged in
either the state government or in the individual citizens; there is no other place for it to go.
Thus, such a claim would also make little sense from a structural standpoint. The Tennessee
Constitution's right to bear arms clause must therefore be interpreted as creating an
individual right. The following Part attempts to discover its purpose.(p.651)
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II. INTERPRETING THE TENNESSEE PROVISION
If the Tennessee right to bear arms provision is textually and structurally distinct from
its counterpart in the Federal Constitution, what does it mean? And how are we to address
that question? In keeping with general principles of constitutional analysis, we can look at
three main sources of enlightenment: the text, the history and intent, and the case law. I will
approach matters in this order.
A. The Text
We previously examined the text of the Tennessee right to bear arms clauses[15] and
that of the distinct Tennessee militia clause.[16] However, it is a bad practice to interpret
legal texts--and particularly constitutional texts--narrowly, without taking account of the
document as a whole. As Bruce Ackerman points out, a competent tax attorney addresses a
tax problem not simply by looking for a single relevant section of the Internal Revenue
Code, but by looking at the overall scheme: it is only "the worst kind of tax lawyer ... who
zeroes in on 'the applicable' subsection without reflecting on the purposes of the sentences,
paragraphs, and larger textual structures within which it is imbedded."[17] Furthermore,
Ackerman is surely right when he says, "Bad tax law makes even worse constitutional
law"[18]
It is thus worth looking at the Tennessee Constitution as a whole to see if it
demonstrates why its framers considered firearms worthy of particular protection. After all,
it may be useful to the state to allow individuals to own all sorts of property, ranging from
steel mills to circular saws; yet, there are no constitutional provisions specifically protecting
those sorts of property. What makes firearms different?
The Tennessee Constitution does not exactly tell us why firearms are different, but the
theory of government it lays out might provide an answer. The first place to look,
appropriately enough, is at the beginning. Article I, Section 1 provides:
That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their
authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; for the advancement of those
ends they have at all times, an (p.652)unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or
abolish the government in such manner as they may think proper.[19]

Article I, Section 2 continues: "That government being instituted for the common benefit,
the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and
destructive of the good and happiness of mankind."[20] Finally, the constitution's
penultimate provision provides:
The declaration of rights hereto prefixed is declared to be a part of the Constitution of this
State, and shall never be violated on any pretense whatever. And to guard against
transgression of the high powers we have delegated, we declare that everything in the bill of
rights contained, is excepted out of the General powers of government, and shall forever
remain inviolate[21]

From these three passages, which are the only ones in the constitution to address pointedly
the first principles of governance, we can construct a coherent theory: All power originates
in the people as the ultimate sovereigns. That power is delegated to governments that are
constituted to promote their peace, safety, and happiness. And the people, as ultimate
sovereigns, retain the ultimate power--and even the duty--to overthrow any government that
fails to respect their authority. This is a classically American theory of the relationship
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between the government and its citizens, very much in accord with the thinking of our
nation's founders,[22] and is thus no surprise in a state constitution said to have been
described by (p.653)Thomas Jefferson as "'the least imperfect and most republican of the state
constitutions.'"[23]
With this conception of government as a somewhat mistrusted agent exercising powers
delegated by its principal, the people, the role of the Declaration of Rights as a means of
guarding against overreaching makes sense. Furthermore, because the ultimate power of the
people is to overthrow a government that overreaches, protecting that ultimate power is an
important goal of the Declaration of Rights, thus explaining why that Declaration includes a
clause protecting the private ownership of firearms. Firearms are, in this sense, distinct from
other forms of property because they are an essential means of making the theoretical right
of revolt a reality.
All of the above suggests an interesting point regarding the "common defense"
language of the Tennessee right to bear arms provision. Modern readers, used to thinking
about the phrase "common defense" as used in the Federal Constitution,[24] are likely to
interpret the term as meaning defense against external enemies. Yet both the language of
the Tennessee Constitution, and the theory of government that it embodies, suggest that it is
the people, not the state, being defended, and that at least part of the "common defense" to
which it refers is defense of the people against a tyrannical government.
If this is so, then it may also help determine what kinds of power the legislature should
have over the private ownership, use, and carriage of firearms. In this view, the legislature
may regulate firearms in ways that are consistent with its general police powers-ways that
are calculated to prevent violent crime but, since the Declaration of Rights constitutes a
carving-out from those general police powers,[25] it may not regulate firearms in ways that
frustrate the ability of the populace to maintain the ability to revolt. In fact, the language of
the Tennessee right to bear arms provision seems consistent with such a view of legislative
powers.
The provision, remember, states: "That the citizens of this State have a right to keep
and to bear arms for their common defense; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to
regulate the wearing of arms with a view to prevent crime."[26] In other words, citizens
may own and practice with ("keep") weapons, and may muster and drill with ("bear") them,
but the legislature may regulate the carrying ("wearing") of arms in order to prevent (p.654)
crime.[27] Several lessons arise from the language of this provision when it is interpreted in
light of the principles contained within the constitution as a whole. First, the right to keep
and bear arms is for a particular purpose: that the people may retain the power of
independence from the government, even (or perhaps especially) to the point of revolt.
Second, there is a distinction between the keeping and bearing of arms, and the wearing of
arms, with the legislature remaining free to regulate the latter to the extent that such
regulation is aimed at preventing crime.
B. The History and Intent
As a matter of pure textual interpretation, we have arrived at a rather straightforward
principle regarding the right to bear arms. Pure textual interpretation is not without risks,
though. As a result, it is generally good practice to check the product of textual
interpretation against the history of the provision and what we know about the framers'
intent.[28] Determining original intent and applying it to a particular question is rarely as
easy or as straightforward as some advocates of originalism suggest,[29] but in many cases
it is possible, and provides a useful aid to construing constitutions and statutes. In
construing constitutional provisions in particular, it is useful to look at both general intent--
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how did the drafters understand the general question involved--and specific intent-what did they intend the provision that they drafted to mean. I will address both issues in
turn.
The Tennessee Constitution was originally drafted in 1796; many of its provisions
survive unchanged to this day. Among them are the provisions of Article I, Section 1, and
Article I, Section 2 quoted earlier, and the right (p.655)to bear arms provision, though (as we
will see) that was somewhat modified in 1834 and 1870. Although historians complain that
historical material explaining the Federal Constitution is somewhat vague, there is far more
of it than there is with regard to the formation of the Tennessee Constitution. Still, it is
possible to learn a number of lessons.
First, there is every reason to believe that the framers of the Tennessee Constitution
were thoroughly influenced by the republican thought of the time. Leaving aside Thomas
Jefferson's statement quoted above,[30] the theory of government outlined in the first two
sections of the Tennessee Constitution--in which all power is delegated by the people, and
in which the people retain the right to revolt if that power is abused--is precisely that of
late-eighteenth-century republicanism.[31] It thus seems fair to impute to the framers of the
Tennessee Constitution the kinds of views held by their contemporaries, about which we
know considerably more.
There is every reason to believe that the political leaders of our nation, whatever their
views on other subjects, were rather strongly unified on the question of private ownership
of arms. Federalists, such as James Madison, held out the private ownership of weapons as
one reason for believing that the new federal government could be trusted not to usurp
power. Madison compared the European governments, which he described as "afraid to
trust the people with arms," to the new federal government, which need not be feared
because Americans possessed "the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess
over the people of almost every other nation."[32] Thomas Jefferson was a vigorous
advocate of gun ownership, both for societal and personal reasons;[33] a model constitution
that he drafted for (p.656)Virginia in 1776 included a provision guaranteeing that "[n]o
freeman shall be debarred the use of arms [within his own lands]."[34] And the
Antifederalist Patrick Henry agreed, stating (in terms reminiscent of the Tennessee
Constitution) his objection to standing armies and his view of the importance of an armed
citizenry. "The great object is, that every man be armed.... Every one who is able may have
a gun."[35](p.657)
These views were not based primarily on an aesthetic appreciation of firearms, but on
a coherent political theory, one not well understood today. That theory had roots in two
main sources: the traditions of the English Common Law, in which arms were prized both
for self-defense and for the right to revolt (rights viewed as closely related) and the political
philosophy of John Locke.[36] I do not intend to lay out in detail the way in which those
two sources informed that theory--this brief essay is not the place, and the task has already
been admirably performed elsewhere.[37] Yet in essence the view parallels that extracted
from the Tennessee Constitution as set forth above: that government is the product of a
delegation of power from the people, that the people retain the right (even the duty) of
revolt whenever that government exceeds the scope of delegation, and that widespread
private ownership of arms is an important means of making that right of revolt real--along,
perhaps, with the implication that so long as the ability to exercise that right remains real it
is unlikely to be needed.
Thus, the powers of government are conceived of as "'a great power of attorney, under
which no power can be exercised but what is expressly given.'"[38] Such rights are
delegated by the majority, but they are not unlimited. As summarized succinctly by Edward
Corwin:
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Not even the majority which determines the form of the government can vest its agent with
arbitrary power, for the reason that the majority right itself originates in a delegation by free
sovereign individuals who had "in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life,
liberty, or possessions" of others ....
....(p.658)
Finally, legislative power is not the ultimate power of the commonwealth, for "the
community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and
designs of anybody, even their legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish or so wicked as
to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject."[39]

For the community to exercise this "supreme power," it is necessary for its members to
be armed--and, indeed, by being armed the community is likely to discourage even the
attempt at oppression. As the Federal Farmer wrote, "[T]o preserve liberty, it is essential
that the whole body of the people always possess arms, and be taught alike, especially when
young, how to use them ...."[40] Or, as Justice Joseph Story, conceded by writers as diverse
as Professors Levinson and Bork to be an excellent source of insight into political thought
at the time of the framing,[41] said
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered as the palladium
of the liberties of a republic, since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and
arbitrary power of rulers, and will generally, even if these are successful in the first
instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them.[42](p.659)

Thus, it seems clear that the political thinkers of late-eighteenth-century America were
unified in their support of private ownership of arms, and considered this a centerpiece of
the political theory underlying the establishment of both the nation and the State of
Tennessee.
If we need more proof that the framers considered the keeping and bearing of arms as
an essential means of protecting liberty, we need only consider what they did when they
desired to deprive a body of citizens--slaves and free citizens of African descent--of any
opportunity for liberty. They disarmed them.
The sad history of this practice is explored at length in Robert Cottrol and Raymond
Diamond's The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration.[43]
Initially, free blacks were treated as free whites--permitted, and even sometimes required, to
bear arms for their defense and the defense of communities. With time, however, they were
gradually disarmed as the white community perceived them as a potential threat to the slave
system.[44] As a result, they were left unable to resist the depredations of both government
forces and of private individuals from whom the government refused to protect them.[45]
Unfortunately, Tennessee's history is reflective of this fact.
The original right to bear arms clause in the Tennessee Constitution of 1796 was
color-blind, providing, "That the freemen of this state have a right to keep and to bear arms
for their common defence."[46] In keeping with its Lockean aspirations, its language was
universal. The constitution of 1834 changed this. With greater unease over slavery came
new language limiting the right to white citizens only.[47]
After the Civil War, with black people guaranteed (at least formally) the rights of full
citizenship, this language was removed. The constitution of 1870 restored the colorblindness of the original provision, but added the proviso allowing the legislature to
regulate the wearing of arms, leaving the clause in its current form.[48] At the constitutional
debate--what little there was--regarding this change, it was explained by Delegate John A.
Gardner that the purpose was to deal with the wave of post-war crime and banditry. Gardner
stated that the purpose of the amendment was to preserve both the right of the people to
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provide for common defense, and the right of (p.660)individuals to self defense, while
still allowing the legislature to act against crime.[49]
Mr. Gardner said, that within a few years past, there has been a fearful and alarming
increase in the number of high crimes-such as murders and robberies--committed by means
of violence, and by the use of arms, in this State. This evil has grown into frightful propo[r]
tions, and the public peace, and private security, demand the most rigorous measures o[f]
repression. The members of the Legislature are impressed with the importance of this
subject, but, I understand, they are restrained from providing efficient remedies, from a
doubt they entertain as to the extent of their power in this direction, under the provisions of
the 26th section of the Bill of Rights. This power, I consider, is secured for the common,
and not for individual defense--as when the peace and safety of the people of the whole
State, or of a county, or even a single neighborhood, is threatened, the people shall have
arms, and a right to bear and use them to preserve the peace and good order of society. I
would not, however, interfere with, or the slightest degree abridge, the citizen's right of selfdefense.
My object is to suppress acts of lawless violence, and diminish the number of murders
and robberies in the State; and every lover of law and order must desire this.
I wish to remove this doubt as to their powers on this subject, heretofore existing in
the minds of the members of our Legislature, which doubt has stood in the way of necessary
remedies being provided for the cure of this great evil.
To this end I offer this amendment, and hope the Convention will adopt it.[50]

The "evils of violence" to which Gardner refers were "Klan tactics," which were carried out
by the State Guard (a paramilitary force under the command of Governor Brownlow) under
color of state law, and extralegally by the Ku Klux Klan and the Union Loyal League.[51]
It is important to note that Gardner's conception of the right to bear arms provision-even after the amendment--remains consistent with the political theory of the original
Tennessee Constitution. Indeed, he specifically notes that fact, and appears to argue that his
amendment merely clarifies an already existing power of the legislature. As we will see, the
case law suggests that he was right, and was not merely engaging in the sort of "this is just a
clarification" smoke-blowing sometimes employed by those offering new laws.(p.661)
C. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Cases
Though there are a number of Tennessee cases that cite the right to bear arms
provision of Article I, Section 26, there are two that are of primary importance.
Conveniently enough, one, Aymette v. State,[52] was decided before the 1870 amendment,
under the provision of the constitution of 1834, and another, Andrews v. State,[53] was
decided just after the 1870 amendment, and applied the provision as it exists today. Both
are important cases, not only in terms of our own state's law, but in terms of what they
reveal about the general American conception of the right to bear arms.[54]
Aymette v. State is an 1840 case that involved a statute that forbade the open or
concealed wearing of a "Bowie knife, Arkansas tooth pick, or other knife or weapon that
shall in form, shape or size resemble a Bowie knife or Arkansas tooth pick."[55] The
defendant was convicted of violating this statute, and appealed.[56] On appeal, the
defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute, relying in large part on the right to
bear arms provision of the 1834 constitution.[57] According to the court, his position was
that
[t]his declaration ... gives to every man the right to arm himself in any manner he may
choose, however unusual or dangerous the weapons he may employ, and, thus armed, to
appear wherever he may think proper, without molestation or hindrance, and that any law
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regulating his social conduct, by restraining the use of any weapon or regulating the
manner in which it shall be carried, is beyond the legislative competency to enact, and is
void.[58]

In answering this claim, the court examined the English and early American history of the
right to bear arms, and concluded that the right to keep and bear arms did not preclude all
legislative regulation of the wearing of arms.[59] As the court said,(p.662)
[E]very free white man may keep and bear arms. But to keep and bear arms for what? If the
history of the subject had left in doubt the object for which the rights is [sic] secured, the
words that are employed must completely remove that doubt. It is declared that they may
keep and bear arms for their common defense. The word "common," here used, means,
according to Webster: 1. Belonging equally to more than one, or to many indefinitely. 2.
Belonging to the public. 3. General. 4. Universal. 5. Public. The object, then, for which the
right of keeping and bearing arms is secured is the defence of the public. The free white
men may keep arms to protect the public liberty, to keep in awe those who are in power, and
to maintain the supremacy of the laws and the constitution. The words "bear arms," too,
have reference to their military use, and were not employed to mean wearing them about the
person as part of the dress. As the object for which the right to keep and bear arms is
secured is of general and public nature, to be exercised by the people in a body, for their
common defence, so the arms the right to keep which is secured are such as are usually
employed in civilized warfare, and that constitute the ordinary military equipment. If the
citizens have these arms in their hands, they are prepared in the best possible manner to
repel any encroachments upon their rights by those in authority. They need not, for such a
purpose, the use of those weapons which are usually employed in private broils, and which
are efficient only in the hands of the robber and the assassin. These weapons would be
useless in war. They could not be employed advantageously in the common defence of the
citizens. The right to keep and bear them is not, therefore, secured by the constitution.
....
The legislature, therefore, have a right to prohibit the wearing or keeping weapons
dangerous to the peace and safety of the citizens, and which are not usual in civilized
warfare, or would not contribute to the common defence.[60]

Apparently concluding both that the "Arkansas tooth-pick" was a weapon not usual in
civilized warfare, and that its carriage in public in the instant case constituted "wearing"
rather than "bearing" of arms,[61] the court upheld the statute. Thus, under the Constitution
of 1834, before the addition of the provision about regulating the "wearing" of arms, the
distinction appeared already to exist as a matter of judicial inference, precisely as Delegate
Gardner suggested.[62](p.663)
At any rate, no major shift occurred in judicial interpretation even after the change in
language brought by the constitution of 1870, which is evident in Andrews v. State.[63] The
defendants in Andrews were charged with violating a statute forbidding "any person to
publicly or privately carry a dirk, sword-cane, Spanish stilleto, belt or pocket pistol or
revolver."[64] They argued that the statute violated their rights under the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and under the right to bear arms clause of the
Tennessee Constitution.[65] The court, in this preincorporation day, made short work of the
first claim, dismissing any suggestion that the Second Amendment to the Federal
Constitution applied to the states with a reference to Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of
Baltimore.[66]
With regard to the second question, the court was more troubled. It was unwilling to
accept the Attorney General's argument that the amendment of 1870 granted the legislature
unlimited power to regulate the wearing of arms-and further, that the right to keep and bear
arms was a mere "political right" that existed for the benefit of the state and hence, could be
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regulated by the state.[67] On the other hand, it was unwilling to retreat from
Aymette's holding that there were some activities that the legislature could regulate.[68] The
court resolved this dilemma by examining the history and nature of the right.[69]
In short, the court found that the right to bear arms is a political right--a right that
exists primarily for the good of the political body. But the right to keep arms is a private,
civil right enforceable by individuals against the state even though it may also serve a
broader public purpose. As the court said,
Bearing arms for the common defense may well be held to be a political right, or for
protection and maintenance of such rights, intended to be guaranteed; but the right to keep
them, with all that is implied fairly as an (p.664)incident to this right, is a private individual
right, guaranteed to the citizen, not the soldier.[70]

The court concluded that citizens have the right to keep military-type weapons, and to
engage in the necessary practice, repair, and transportation of such weapons, even in the
absence of any militia connection.[71] However, the legislature retains the right to regulate
the wearing of military-type weapons,[72] and to ban non-military weapons, so long as that
regulation does not amount to a prohibition and so long as it bears a well-defined relation to
the prevention of crime.[73] The court held that as applied to repeating pistols--which the
court said were military equipment--the statute was unconstitutional since it prohibited their
keeping and use, but upheld the (p.665)statute as applied to the other, nonmilitary weapons.
[74] This case remains the leading case in Tennessee today, and its principles continue to
prevail.[75]
III. SOME ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF CURRENT PROBLEMS
So where does this leave us? Strangely enough, in a place that is unlikely to satisfy
either pro- or anti-gun partisans. As a matter of black-letter law, the Tennessee
constitutional provision means almost precisely what it says. Citizens are free to own
military-type weapons,[76] to practice with them, to transport them for purposes of
maintenance and practice, and to make reasonable nonviolent use of them. The legislature,
however, remains free to prohibit ownership of nonmilitary weapons, and to regulate the
wearing of military weapons, so long as the regulations are reasonable and bear a close
relation to the purpose of preventing crime.
This leads to one seeming paradox. Assault weapons, those repeating arms that make
up the primary weapons of today's military forces throughout the world, are far more
military in character than the predominantly bolt-action rifles and shotguns typically
employed by hunters. If, as the case law holds, the state constitution protects primarily
military weapons, then arguably there is less constitutional protection for hunting weapons
than for the far more controversial assault weapons. This result likely will please neither
most pro-gun advocates, who I suspect tend to be hunters, nor antigun crusaders, who seem
especially opposed to the idea of military-type weapons in civilian hands. However, the
main purpose of including a right to bear arms provision in the Tennessee Constitution (and
quite likely in the United States Constitution as well) was to preserve a substantial degree of
military power in the citizenry at large, so as to prevent tyranny--not to protect hunters. So
there is really no paradox at all: although today's political debate on gun ownership seems
often to turn on the question of "legitimate sporting and hunting uses," that aspect of gun
ownership is irrelevant to the constitutional analysis, except to the extent that it overlaps
with the purpose of keeping individuals competent at the use of arms. (In practice, of
course, that overlap is likely to be substantial. Hunting weapons by their very nature are
likely to have sufficient military utility to fall within the provision's protections, as
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illustrated by the Andrews court's reference to rifles "of all descriptions, the shotgun,
the musket, and the repeater" as (p.666)being protected.[77] Nonetheless, the point remains:
constitutionally, guns that are "only good for killing people" are the ones that ought to be
most protected, because maintaining among the citizenry at large just that ability to "kill
people" is precisely the reason for the provision. Revolutions, after all, tend to involve
killing, as does resistance to government oppression, of which our forefathers were well
aware from firsthand experience.
This is also why limitations on the wearing of arms are constitutionally permissible.
Though there is no question that at the time of the framing of the Tennessee provision selfdefense was considered to be a fundamental right, probably even trumping the principles of
the constitution, and that the classical notion of self-defense is more closely related to the
larger question of maintaining a right to revolt than most modern commentators recognize,
[78] the self-defense envisioned by the framers was generally that of the home, not the
person abroad in society. As both the Aymette and Andrews courts noted, when abroad in
society we must generally look first to the social contract for our defense.[79]
The law as it exists is thus unlikely to please those Rambo wannabes who--like the
defendant in Aymette--believe that they have a right to festoon themselves with any and all
weapons and stroll about clanking like an extra in a bad war movie, because it clearly
allows the legislature to enact sensible regulations regarding the wearing of arms. It is also
unlikely to please those who, like Attorney General Heiskell in Andrews, believe that the
legislature should be able to pass whatever laws it chooses regarding arms.[80] Yet the
Tennessee Supreme Court's interpretation of the right to (p.667)bear arms provision presents a
reasonable compromise: every citizen is allowed to possess arms that will be entirely
suitable for the defense of home and liberty, to practice shooting, to transport arms for
repairs, to purchase ammunition, and to do everything needful to the exercise of the citizen's
rights. And, because so many do so, all of us have less to worry about in terms of
governmental tyranny and oppression.
This last point may seem odd to many. Do privately owned weapons really preserve
freedom? Would not individual citizens, with only the equivalent of infantry light arms, be
hopelessly outgunned in confrontation with professional soldiers armed with tanks, cannon,
and aircraft? Would an oppressive government--or a Seven Days in May[81] style cabal--be
deterred in the slightest by an armed citizenry? What good are rifles, even assault rifles,
when the government has nuclear weapons? Haven't times changed so much that the notion
of a right to bear arms is simply obsolete?
These objections may seem profound to many, but in fact we do not take objections
based on technological advances seriously in the context of other constitutional rights. No
one seriously argues that freedom of speech does not include broadcasting, telephones, or
electronic amplification, or that freedom of the press does not include word processors,
laser printers, or photocopy machines. The world of political discourse has changed far
more profoundly than the world of arms, and yet we have responded to those changes by
expanding individual rights, not by contracting them. I fail to see why the right to bear arms
should be different.[82] Although my own (p.668)constitutional scholarship would likely be
characterized as liberal,[83] it is my opinion that when this country has gone wrong, it has
been because it departed from the principles of its framing--for example, in disarming and
otherwise oppressing African-Americans, or by succumbing to wartime hysteria and
censoring opposition literature or imprisoning Americans of Japanese descent--not when it
has stuck to them. In this sense, I suppose that I am profoundly conservative.
And at any rate, objections based on changes in military technology are not only bad
law; they appear to be wrong on the facts. In my lifetime, the only real military victory that
the United States has had, the Persian Gulf War, came against an opponent armed with
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tanks, cannon, and aircraft. Whenever we, with our sophisticated weapons, have come
up against irregulars with light arms, from Vietnam to Lebanon to Somalia, we have
basically gotten our clocks cleaned. The disastrous Soviet experience in Afghanistan
suggests the same lesson. On the basis of experience, the case that an armed citizenry has
become militarily impotent, and hence irrelevant, is not very persuasive, except perhaps to
the already persuaded.
But perhaps the real question is not technology, but politics. Maybe we have reached
such a stage of comfortable freedom and political stability that the likelihood of oppression
is so low, and the need for revolution or resistance so far-fetched, that the very purpose
behind the right to bear arms is now gone. This would be a compelling argument, were it
true, rendering the right to bear arms a mere historical curiosity, like the Titles of Nobility
Clauses in the Federal Constitution.[84] Once again, however, the facts appear otherwise. It
is true that (p.669)our framers (of both the Tennessee and Federal Constitutions), coming out
of war, revolution, and multiple changes of government, wrote against a more violent and
uncertain background than most modem Americans can imagine. Since the framing, we
have enjoyed far more stability, peace, and prosperity than the framers could have hoped
for. But this undeniable fact does not undercut the notion that the framers knew what they
were doing--instead, it rather strongly suggests the opposite, that they did a very good job
indeed. These good results should make us rather cautious about making wholesale changes
in their plan: after all, we have enjoyed all of this freedom, stability, and prosperity with an
armed citizenry, something that the framers, at least, considered a crucial guarantor of just
such things. Perhaps the armed citizenry was irrelevant, but how can we know? Are we
willing to take the chance?
Furthermore--and I struggle every year to convince my constitutional law students of
this--the peace and stability that Americans have enjoyed constitute a substantial aberration
in the normal course of human events. The background of war, revolution, and violence
against which our institutions were formed represents much more the norm of human
existence than the domestic peace and stability that Americans have enjoyed in this century.
From Cambodia to Yugoslavia, from Liberia to Haiti, the history of this century has largely
been one of violence, instability, and the oppression and often annihilation of those too
weak to resist. We may try to convince ourselves that something in the North American soil
or climate renders us immune to these destructive forces, but it appears more likely that our
relative tranquility has resulted from a combination of luck and well-crafted institutions.
This, too, should make us less willing to make wholesale changes in those parts of our
system of governance that were in fact d esigned to deal with precisely these kinds of
problems; luck does not last forever, and even in the United States, there have been some
substantial institutional breakdowns.
Nor is our own era as peaceful and stable as we would like to believe. In different
ways, both the Rodney King beating and the L.A. riots suggest the dangers of overreliance
on police and government authorities to maintain public order. And for minorities and those
without political clout, the public authorities have always been unreliable: sometimes
enemies, sometimes simply indifferent, but rarely the sturdy protectors that they generally
are for the wealthy and powerful.[85] So there may be, even today, a role for an armed
citizenry.
That is the lesson that the Tennessee Constitution holds for us, and we are likely to
live under its right to bear arms provision for some time, given the (p.670)notorious difficulty
of amending that document.[86] Nor are the prospects for an "amendment by judicial
reinterpretation" all that favorable: the case law is simply too clear, and any change at this
late date would probably be perceived as political action by the judiciary.[87] We are likely
stuck with the judgment of our forefathers on this subject.
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That may not be so bad, and I have a suggestion or two as to how to use their wisdom,
rather than deny it. I propose that we consider bringing the militia back, though perhaps in a
twentieth (or maybe twenty-first) century form. It has by now become so commonplace as
to be beyond trendy to state that our nation has lost sight of community values. A
widespread "communitarian" movement, with its own journals,[88] books,[89] and so on,
now exists in our country and its spirit has been echoed repeatedly in speeches and writings
of our current President.[90] There is also a strong sense that the real answer to crime is
community involvement, ranging from law-enforcement approaches like the "Police
Corps's"[91] or "community policing"[92] to farther-reaching efforts to involve the entire
community in crime prevention.[93]
Since the root of our contemporary crime problem probably has more to do with our
decaying social fabric and with the reluctance of individuals (p.671)to accept civic duties than
with the availability of firearms, perhaps it is time to begin addressing the problem at its
root. In the days prior to the invention of professional police forces in the early part of the
nineteenth century, responding to crime was not seen as vigilantism, but as a civic duty-one backed by sanctions. The cry of "Stop Thief!" was not simply a cartoon cliche, but had
the legal consequence of compelling all within its hearing to aid in arresting a thief.
Individuals took turns on the "watch and ward," patrolling cities and towns at night.
Everyone was seen as having a real stake in the maintenance of public order.[94]
Today, with the increasing professionalization of law enforcement, the stock phrase is
not "Stop Thief!" but "Don't get involved." People, often encouraged by law enforcement
professionals possessing a natural desire to protect their professional turf, have followed
that advice with a vengeance. The Kitty Genovese case, in which bystanders and neighbors
ignored a brutal stabbing, was news at the time; now it is news when a bystander intervenes.
[95] Reversing this trend would probably do more to address our crime problem than either
compulsory handgun licensing, or anti-assault weapon legislation.
Of course, unlike those legislative options it would require work from citizens, and
from politicians, and that may be my suggestion's biggest flaw. I have no doubt that if all
able-bodied citizens were required to put in a few days per year walking the streets of their
neighborhoods, crime would drop substantially. Citizens could be called together for
training and equipment inspection ("mustered") and could be required to provide
themselves with the necessary equipment, whether that included firearms or not. This would
produce direct results--in terms of law enforcement on the streets--lightyears beyond
current proposals to add additional professional police, and at far lower cost. However, I
wonder whether politicians will be willing to endorse such a requirement, in a society that
struggles to get people to show up for jury duty.
This difficulty in securing public service is one reason why the militia system initially
declined.[96] Everyone wants to be a free rider, and I have (p.672)no illusions about the
enthusiasm of the average citizen for tramping about the streets in midwinter in search of
crime. But the burden is not that great, and the statutory authority for imposing it is already
on the books, both at the state[97] and federal levels.[98]
Further, it may be that people will surprise us with their public-spiritedness: they
sometimes do. When my own usually quiet neighborhood was faced with a sudden crime
wave a couple of years ago, the rather unmilitary (but formidable) women of the Garden
Club organized neighborhood patrols, and a neighborhood association that continues to
provide security. People were rather quick to pitch in. The crime wave ended--in part
because of that program, which led to several arrests, and in part because one armed
householder a few blocks from me shot an intruder one night. (The intruder escaped, but the
burglaries stopped.) So resistance to a modern militia-based program might not be that
great, at least so long as citizens' concern with crime remained real. And even if politicians
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are unwilling to organize the citizenry, the citizenry may well respond to increasing
crime rates, and the increasing inability of law enforcement authorities to respond to it, by
organizing themselves. If they do so, the militia clause, along with the right to bear arms
clause, will probably protect their right to bear arms in the classic sense.
We have spent the last hundred years or so expecting steadily less from citizens in
terms of public involvement and civic responsibilities. Not (p.673)surprisingly, most citizens
have managed to live down to these expectations. Instead of trying to find new ways to
protect people, and society, from irresponsibility through regulation, perhaps it is time to
start expecting more from people: more involvement, more responsibility, more simple
goodness. We might find that people will manage to live up to these expectations, as they
have lived down to the current ones. The framers of our constitutions, at both the state and
federal levels, certainly thought so, and the state of our society today suggests that they may
have known something that we have forgotten. Perhaps it is time to remember.
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in this opinion the Legislature had the right to pass the law." Id. at 160, 2 Hum. at 161-62. Though it is
impossible to know, the sudden change in manner brings to mind the sort of fuzzing-over that is sometimes
needed to secure a majority.
[62] See supra text accompanying note 60.
[63] See 50 Tenn. at 141, 3 Heisk. at 165.
[64] Act of June 11, 1870, ch. 13 (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-16-402, -17-1307, -171315 (1991 & Supp. 1993)).
[65] The defendants' arguments are summarized at 50 Tenn. at 142-44,3 Heisk. at 166-68.
[66] 32 U.S. 180, 7 Pet. 243 (1833). For the Tennessee court's discussion of this issue, see 50 Tenn. at
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147-50, 3 Heisk. at 171-75.
[67] 50 Tenn. at 156-57, 3 Heisk. at 182-84. Attorney General Heiskell appears to have been making the
somewhat tautological argument that the legislature could outlaw the use of arms, except by those in active
rebellion. "It is insisted by the Attorney General, that the right to keep and bear arms is a political, not a civil
right ... It is said by the Attorney General that the Legislature may prohibit the use of arms common in warfare,
but not the use of them in warfare ...." Id. at 156, 3 Heisk. at 182.
[68] Id. at 158, 3 Heisk. at 185 (citing 21 Tenn. at 157, 2 Hum. at 159).
[69] Id. at 154-58, 162, 3 Heisk. at 180-84, 189.
[70] Id. at 156, 3 Heisk. at 182 (emphasis added).
[71] Id. at 153, 3 Heisk. at 178-79. According to the court:
The right to keep arms, necessarily involves the right to purchase them, to keep them in a state
of efficiency for use, and to purchase and provide ammunition suitable for such arms, and to keep
them in repair. And clearly for this purpose, a man would have the right to carry them to and from his
home, and no one could claim that the Legislature had the right to punish him for it, without violating
this clause of the Constitution.
But farther than this, it must be held, that the right to keep arms involves, necessarily, the right
to use such arms for all the ordinary purposes, and in all the ordinary modes usual in the country, and
to which arms are adapted, limited by the duties of a good citizen in times of peace; that in such use,
he shall not use them for violation of the rights of others, or the paramount rights of the community of
which he makes a part.
Id. The court noted that the militia was by then already a nearly defunct organization, preserved in the state and
federal constitutions and in the statute books but otherwise of no remaining importance. Id. at 158, 3 Heisk. at
184. The court held, however, that this change in practice did not affect the substance of the constitutional
rights. Id. at 158-59, 3 Heisk. at 184-85.
[72] Id. at 154, 3 Heisk. at 179-80. Such weapons were defined, in essentially the same terms used in
Aymette, as those weapons actually used by the military, including "the rifle of all descriptions, the shot gun, the
musket, and repeater ... and that under the Constitution the right to keep such arms, can not be infringed or
forbidden by the Legislature." Id. at 154, 3 Heisk. at 179; see also 21 Tenn. at 159, 2 Hum. at 160-61.
[73] 50 Tenn. at 158-61, 3 Heisk. at 185-88.
But the power is given to regulate, with a view to prevent crime. The enactment of the
Legislature on this subject, must be guided by, and restrained to this end, and bear some well defined
relation to the prevention of crime, or else it is unauthorized by this clause of the Constitution.
Id. at 155, 3 Heisk. at 181. This statement makes clear that weapons legislation that is not plainly based on
prevention of crime--instead being motivated by, say, a fear of accidents or a sense that guns give some people
the "willies"--would not be constitutional. That makes sense when we remember that the right to bear arms
clause removes weapons regulation from the general police power of the legislature, and substitutes only a
single permissible ground, crime prevention, for such legislation. See TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 16; see also
supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
[74] 50 Tenn. at 159-60, 3 Heisk. at 186-87.
[75] See LEWIS L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 57-58
(1990); 25 TENN. JUR. Weapons § 4 (1985).
[76] The United States Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed the Tennessee approach to the "military
use" question. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (citing Aymette for point that Second
Amendment protects weapons that are "part of the ordinary military equipment").
[77] 50 Tenn. at 154, 3 Heisk. at 179.
[78] This is a point made by Don Kates, supra note 34. It is also taken quite seriously in both Andrews
and Aymette.
[79] 50 Tenn. at 160-64, 3 Heisk. at 188-92; 21 Tenn. at 158-59, 2 Hum. at 160-61. Once again,
however, note that any such regulation must bear a well-defined relation to the prevention of crime; lacking
such a basis, it is outside the legislature's power.
[80] I would be remiss if I did not note that this appears to be the opinion of more recent Attorneys
General as well--at least, recent opinions of the Tennessee Attorney General evidence such a view. See 90 OP.
TENN. ATT'Y GEN. 32, 103 (1990); 89 OP. TENN. ATT'Y GEN. 54 (1989). However, I do not consider those
opinions particularly persuasive, as they appear founded upon little analysis, and no consideration at all of the
historical basis for the right. For example, in Opinion 89-54 the Attorney General opined that a ban on militarystyle assault weapons is not prohibited by the Tennessee Constitution. However, that opinion, which is little
more than a page in length, contains no analysis beyond the statement that assault weapons are not "the usual
arms of the citizen of the country," in the language of Andrews, and thus concludes that they are not protected.
There is no attempt to reconcile this conclusion with the language from the same case--which is even quoted in
the opinion--that the arms protected are "the arms in the use of which a soldier should be trained," or with
language from Aymette, also quoted in the opinion, that the arms protected are "such as are usually employed in
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civilized warfare, and that constitute the ordinary military equipment." Similarly, in Opinion 90-103, the
Attorney General appears to believe that the only weapons protected are those that existed in 1871 (a
technologically stagnant view that would be unimaginable in, say, the context of free speech cases), and that
burdens on "sports and recreational" uses are constitutionally significant. 90 OP. TENN. ATT'Y GEN. 103, at 8-9.
In neither opinion is any reference made to the intended purpose of the clause in terms of maintaining an
independent military power on the part of the people. Indeed, in Opinion 90-32, the Attorney General appears to
believe that the purpose of the Tennessee Constitution's right to keep and bear arms clause is to prevent the
legislature from disarming the organized military forces of the state. This makes no sense at all, as no
constitutional provision is needed to prevent the government from disarming itself. As the language of the
relevant Tennessee constitutional provisions makes quite clear, the framers were not concerned with the danger
of a disarmed government, but rather with one that possessed a monopoly of violence. The failure to consider
this purpose, or even to read the Andrews and Aymette opinions with fidelity, undercuts the persuasiveness of
these opinions sharply, notwithstanding the prestige and authority of their source.
[81] See FLETCHER KNEBEL & CHARLES W. BAILEY II, SEVEN DAYS IN MAY (1962) (fictional
account of a secret military scheme to overthrow the United States government).
[82] Nor are the real social costs of widespread gun ownership necessarily an argument against
recognizing the constitutional right; we certainly do not entertain such arguments in the context of other
constitutional rights, like freedom of the press. Mein Kampf and the Communist Manifesto have undoubtedly led
to far more deaths (by tens of millions) than privately owned arms, but we would not suppress them on that
account. As Professor Levinson notes:
If one does accept the plausibility of any of the arguments on behalf of a strong reading of the Second
Amendment, but, nevertheless, rejects them in the name of social prudence and the present-day
consequences produced by finicky adherence to earlier understandings, why do we not apply such
consequentialist criteria to each and every part of the Bill of Rights? As Ronald Dworkin has argued,
what it means to take rights seriously is that one will honor them even when there is significant social
cost in doing so. If protecting freedom of speech, the rights of criminal defendants, or any other part
of the Bill of Rights were always (or even most of the time) clearly costless to the society as a whole,
it would truly be impossible to understand why they would be as controversial as they are.... "Costbenefit" analysis, rightly or wrongly, has come to be viewed as a "conservative" weapon to attack
liberal rights. Yet one finds that the tables are strikingly turned when the Second Amendment comes
into play.
Levinson, supra note 3, at 657-58 (footnotes omitted).
[83] See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Glenn H. Reynolds, News Media Satellites and the First Amendment:
A Case Study in the Treatment of New Technologies, 3 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1988); Glenn H. Reynolds,
Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333 (1992); Reynolds, supra note 29.
[84] U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (forbidding federal government from creating titles of nobility); see
also id. art. I, § 10, cl. I (extending prohibition to the states). Though this point may cut both ways. As Charles
Black pointed out to me when I was a law student, the Titles of Nobility Clause is one of the few constitutional
provisions that can be said to have worked perfectly. Its apparent obsolescence is thus in a sense the strongest
possible evidence of its importance.
[85] Professors Cottrol and Diamond report an incident that took place in Memphis, Tennessee,
in 1891 in which a black militia unit for two or three nights guarded approximately 100 jailed blacks
who were deemed at risk of mob violence. When it seemed the crisis had passed, the militia unit
ceased its work. It was only after the militia unit left that a white mob stormed the jail and lynched
three black inmates.
Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 11, at 354 (citing IDA B. WELLS BARNETT, CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF IDA B. WELLS 50 (Alfreda M. Duster ed., 1970)).
[86] See TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (procedures for amending Tennessee Constitution)
[87] See generally Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions:
Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473 (1987) (arguing
that state constitutions should be hard to amend, and should not be amended by judicial reinterpretation,
because the traditional revision processes, though cumbersome, reflect the sovereignty of the people and
preserve the integrity of the political and judicial processes).
[88] For example, Amitai Etzioni's journal, The Responsive Community, whose subtitle stresses that it is
about "Rights and Responsibilities."
[89] See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985); COMMUNITY IN AMERICA: THE CHALLENGE OF HABITS OF THE
HEART (Charles H. Reynolds & Ralph V. Norman eds., 1988).
[90] See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, Radio Address to the American People (Oct. 23, 1993), in
29 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 2157 (1993) (calling for "community policing networks
so that they'll know their neighbors and they'll work with people not simply to catch criminals but to prevent
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crime in the first place. We want to put more power in the hands of local communities ....").
[91] See, e.g., Adam Walinsky et al., The New Police Corps, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395 (1983); see
also Jack Wenik, The New Police Corps: A Response, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 412 (1983).
[92] See, e.g., Neal R. Pierce, The Case for Community Policing, 23 NAT'L J., 2982 (1991); George F.
Will, Policing a Chicago Enclave, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 1993, at 76; James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling,
Making Neighborhoods Safe, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1989, at 46; Gordon Witkin & Dan McGraw, Beyond
'Just the Facts, Ma'am,' U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 2, 1993, at 28.
[93] See, e.g., REUBEN GREENBERG & ARTHUR GORDON, LET'S TAKE BACK OUR STREETS! (1989).
[94] See Kates, supra note 34, at 91-104 (describing colonial practice); Malcolm, supra note 37, at 29095 (describing legal responsibilities under English law).
[95] For an interesting summary of the Genovese murder and its effect on at least one state jurist in a
"defense of a third person" case, see Hughes v. State, 719 S.W.2d 560, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc)
(Teague, J., concurring) (concurrence entitled, "A Requiem Dedicated to the Kitty Genoveses of This
Country").
[96] For example, see Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 157-58, 3 Heisk. at 184:
Mr. Story adds, in this section: "Yet though this truth would seem to be so clear, (the
importance of a militia,) it can not be disguised that among the American people, there is a growing
indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from a sense of its burdens,
to be rid of all regulations. How is it practicable," he asks, "to keep the people duly armed without
some organization, it is difficult to see. There is certainly no small danger that indifference may lead
to disgust, and disgust to contempt, and thus gradually undermine all the protection intended by this
clause of our national bill of rights."
We may for a moment, pause to reflect on the fact, that what was once deemed a stable and
essential bulwark of freedom, "a well regulated militia," though the clause still remains in our
Constitutions, both State and Federal, has, as an organization, passed away in almost every State of
the Union, and only remains to us as a memory of the past, probably never to be revived.
Id. (quoting 2 STORY, supra note 42, § 1897). So far, of course, Story has been proved right in his prediction,
but it remains in our power to prove the Andrews court wrong.
[97] TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1-301 (1989) (allowing Governor, with advice and consent of general
assembly, to call out militia "at any time that public safety requires it"). But see TENN. CONST. art. III, § 5
(providing that militia shall not be called into service, except in case of rebellion or invasion, and then only
when the general assembly shall declare by law that the public safety requires it).
[98] 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1988) (defining militia of the United States); 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1988) (providing
that the President may call out the militia if, "in a State, any ... domestic violence ... so hinders the execution of
the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of
a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution"). If the crime problem is as severe as we
are told, it would appear to justify a militia call-out at least in those localities where citizens are unable to walk
the streets and otherwise engage in constitutionally protected liberties of movement and association for fear of
cnme that the duly constituted authorities have been unable to address. Such localities might include the District
of Columbia, or Los Angeles, for example.
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